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Abstract
Bohmian mechanics, also known as pilot-wave theory or de Broglie–Bohm the-
ory, is a formulation of quantum mechanics whose fundamental axioms are not
about what observers will see if they perform an experiment but about what
happens in reality. It is therefore called a “quantum theory without observers,”
alongside with collapse theories [11, 48] and many-worlds theories [59, 2] and in
contrast to orthodox quantum mechanics. It follows from these axioms that in a
universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, observers will see outcomes with exactly
the probabilities specified by the usual rules of quantum mechanics for empirical
predictions. Specifically, Bohmian mechanics asserts that electrons and other el-
ementary particles have a definite position at every time and move according to
an equation of motion that is one of the fundamental laws of the theory and in-
volves a wave function that evolves according to the usual Schro¨dinger equation.
Bohmian mechanics is named after David Bohm (1917–1992), who was, although
not the first to consider this theory, the first to realize (in 1952) that it actually
makes correct predictions.
1 Fundamental Laws of Bohmian Mechanics
While Bohmian mechanics has been considered as a tool for visualization [57], for the
efficient numerical simulation of the Schro¨dinger equation [18], and other applications
[56], the main interest in it arises from the fact that Bohmian mechanics provides a
possible way how our world might be and might work.
In its non-relativistic form, the theory asserts the following: N material points (“par-
ticles”) move in 3-dimensional Euclidean space (denoted for simplicity as R3) in a way
governed by a field-like entity that is mathematically given by a wave function ψ (as fa-
miliar from standard quantum mechanics). More precisely, the position Qk(t) of particle
number k at time t obeys Bohm’s equation of motion
dQk(t)
dt
=
~
mk
Im
ψ∗∇kψ
ψ∗ψ
(Q(t), t) , (1)
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where Q(t) = (Q1(t), . . . ,QN(t)) ∈ R3N denotes the configuration of the particle system
at time t, mk is the mass of particle k, Im the imaginary part of a complex number,
ψ : R3N+1 → Cd is the wave function, and ψ∗φ denotes the scalar product in spin space
Cd,
ψ∗φ =
d∑
s=1
ψ∗s φs . (2)
For spinless particles (d = 1), ψ∗ is the usual complex conjugate of ψ, and the factor ψ∗
cancels out of (1); in that case, we can express ψ in terms of its modulus R and phase S
as ψ = ReiS/~, and obtain m−1k ∇kS for the right-hand side of (1). Yet another way of
writing the right-hand side of (1) is jk/ρ, where jk = (~/mk)Im(ψ∗∇kψ) is the quantity
known in quantum mechanics as the probability current and ρ = ψ∗ψ the probability
density.
The wave function ψ(q, t) = ψ(q1, . . . , qN , t) evolves with time t according to the
usual Schro¨dinger equation
i~
∂ψ(q, t)
∂t
= −
N∑
k=1
~2
2mk
∇2kψ(q, t) + V (q)ψ(q, t) , (3)
where V : R3N → R is the potential function, for example the Coulomb potential
V (q1, . . . , qN) =
1
2
∑
j 6=k
ejek
|qj − qk|
(4)
with ej the electric charge of particle j. The state of the system at time t is described
by the pair
(
Q(t), ψ(t)
)
, and Equations (1) and (3) together determine the state at any
other time; thus, Bohmian mechanics is a deterministic theory.
By a mathematical fact known as the “equivariance theorem” [13, 30], if the initial
configuration Q(0) is random with probability density |ψ(q, t = 0)|2, then at every time
t,
Q(t) is |ψ(q, t)|2 distributed. (5)
It is another basic rule of the theory that the configuration is indeed so distributed—
this is the equivalent of the Born rule in Bohmian mechanics. As discussed in Section 9
below, this rule follows if it is assumed that the initial configuration of the universe
is typical relative to the |Ψ|2 distribution, where Ψ is the initial wave function of the
universe.
We note that Bohmian mechanics is time reversal invariant: if t 7→ (Q(t), ψ(t)) is a
solution of (1) and (3), then so is t 7→ (Q(−t), ψ∗(−t)), and also Born’s rule still holds
for the time reverse. Likewise, Bohmian mechanics is invariant under Galilean boosts,
spatial rotations, and space-time translations (see, e.g., [30]). I also note that equations
of motion analogous to (1) have been devised for a wide class of Hamiltonians [62],
not just non-relativistic Schro¨dinger operators as in (3). In particular, the equation of
motion for the 1-particle Dirac equation [14, 15] asserts that the possible world-lines (i.e.,
particle paths in space-time) are the integral curves of the probability current 4-vector
field jµ = ψγµψ.
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2 Example: The Double-Slit Experiment
In Bohmian mechanics there is wave–particle duality in a literal sense: There is a wave,
and there is a particle. In the double-slit experiment, the wave passes through both slits,
whereas the particle passes through only one slit in each run. In Figure 1, a sample of
80 alternative trajectories is shown.
Figure 1: Several possible trajectories for a Bohmian particle in a double-slit setup,
coming from the left. (Reprinted from [34], based on a figure in [57].)
We may place a detecting screen at the right end of the figure. Since the trajectories
in the sample are roughly |ψ|2 distributed, their arrival points are also |ψ|2 distributed
by equivariance. One can see in Figure 1 that there are some locations in which more
trajectories arrive—in fact, those are the locations where |ψ|2 is large; thus, an interfer-
ence pattern with bright and dark fringes is visible in the arrival points on the screen,
in agreement with the empirical findings. This is how Bohmian mechanics explains the
double-slit experiment, without any paradox remaining [8].
For the outcome of the experiment, it is crucial that the motion of the Bohmian
particle is non-Newtonian, and that its trajectory can be bent also in the absence of
external force fields. It is bent because the equation of motion (1) dictates it. Note also
that the motion of the particle, if it went through the upper slit, will depend also on the
part of the wave function that went through the lower slit. In particular, the motion of
the particle depends on whether both slits are open, and would have been different if
one slit had been closed. With only one slit open, the distribution of the arrival points
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on the screen would have created a different interference pattern. If both slits are open,
then the particle, although it passes only through one slit, “knows” this because the
wave passed through both slits. Note that the Bohmian explanation of the double-slit
experiment involves no faster-than-light effects and no retrocausation. This is still true
in Wheeler’s [69] “delayed choice” variant of the experiment, which was explained using
Bohmian mechanics in [8].
3 Empirical Predictions
An analysis of Bohmian mechanics shows that its empirically testable predictions agree
exactly with those of standard quantum mechanics, whenever the latter are unambigu-
ous [13, 8, 30]. Thus, Bohmian mechanics is a counter-example to the claim put forward
by Niels Bohr [16] (and often repeated since) that in quantum mechanics a single co-
herent picture of reality be impossible. In particular, it turns out that the statistics
of outcomes of experiments are related to the operators known as “observables” in the
same way as in standard quantum mechanics. The fact that these operators in general
do not commute has often in orthodox quantum mechanics been taken as a sign that a
“realistic” picture be impossible, whereas Bohmian mechanics shows how it is, in fact,
possible; see Section 7 below for more detail.
The predictive rules of standard quantum mechanics include the collapse of the wave
function; in fact, an effective collapse of the wave function of a system s comes out of the
equations of Bohmian mechanics, although the wave function of the universe never col-
lapses. Here is how. In a (hypothetical) universe governed by Bohmian mechanics, also
observers and measurement apparatus are made of Bohmian particles, and are jointly
governed by Equations (1) and (3). During the experiment, the initial wave function
ψ0(qs, qa) = ϕ(qs)χ(qa) of the system s and apparatus a together evolves according to
(3) to ψt(qs, qa). Suppose that whenever ϕ is an eigenfunction ϕα of the self-adjoint
operator A with eigenvalue α, the final wave function is of the form
ψt(qs, qa) = ϕα(qs)χα(qa) , (6)
where t is the duration of the experiment, and χα is a wave function of an apparatus
displaying the outcome α; this would be the case in an “ideal quantum measurement”
of A. Then it follows by the linearity of (3) for an arbitrary superposition ϕ =
∑
α cα ϕα
of eigenfunctions that
ψt(qs, qa) =
∑
α
cα ϕα(qs)χα(qa) . (7)
Since the actual configuration Q(t) = (Qs, Qa) is |ψt|2 distributed, and since χα is
concentrated on those configurations in which the apparatus displays the outcome α (say,
by the position of a pointer), Qa has probability |cα|2 to be such a configuration; this
probability value for obtaining the outcome α agrees with the rules of standard quantum
mechanics. Moreover, since the various χα have macroscopically disjoint supports in
configuration space, the packets ψα(qs, qa) = ϕα(qs)χα(qa) will remain non-overlapping
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for the next 10100 years or more. But as long as ψ =
∑
α cα ψα consists of non-overlapping
packets, the motion of Q(t), which is governed according to (1) by ψ and its derivatives
at Q(t), will depend only on one packet, the one containing Q(t). Thus, it makes no
difference for the future motion of all particles (at least for the next 10100 years) if we
drop all other packets ψα′ and replace ψ by ψα with α the actual outcome. The |ψα|2
distribution represents the conditional probability distribution of Q(t), given that Q(t)
lies in the support of ψα (i.e., given that the outcome was α). That is why the wave
function can be collapsed (ψ 7→ ψα), yielding an eigenfunction ϕα for the system s. I
called it an “effective” collapse because one can practically replace ψ 7→ ψα although
the true wave function is still the uncollapsed ψ.
More generally (beyond ideal quantum measurements), in (spinless) Bohmian me-
chanics every system s can be attributed a wave function of its own, the conditional
wave function
ψ(s)(qs) = ψ(qs, Qa) (8)
obtained by inserting the actual configuration of the environment a (and normalizing if
desired). (In the presence of spin, one uses a conditional density matrix [29].) In the
situation discussed before, ψ(s) ∝ ϕ before the measurement and ψ(s) ∝ ϕα afterwards.
The conditional wave function evolves according to the Schro¨dinger equation (3) if there
is no interaction between s and a and s is suitably disentangled from a (viz., ψ(qs, qa) =
ϕ(qs)χ(qa)+ψ
⊥(qs, qa) with the qa-support of ψ⊥ macroscopically disjoint from Qa), but
not in general. In a measurement-like situation, the conditional wave function undergoes
a genuine collapse.
In orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM), one cannot form the conditional wave func-
tion as there is no Qa. What is worse, since OQM insists that there are no variables (such
as Q) in addition to the wave function, and since the post-measurement wave function
(7) is a superposition of terms corresponding to all possible outcomes, there is nothing
in the state according to OQM at time t that would represent the actual outcome—a
problem known as the quantum measurement problem. The only ways out are (i) to
introduce further variables (as in Bohmian mechanics), (ii) to deny the linearity of the
time evolution of the wave function (as in collapse theories such as GRW [11, 48]), or
(iii) to deny that there is a single outcome (as in many-worlds theories [59, 2]).
4 Limitations to Knowledge and Control
In classical mechanics, one usually pretends that one can measure the state of a system
(position and momentum of all particles) to arbitrary accuracy without disturbing it,
and that one can in principle prepare a system in any state. In Bohmian mechanics, in
contrast, there are sharp limitations to knowledge and control: inhabitants of a Bohmian
universe cannot know the position of a particle more precisely than allowed by the |ψ|2
distribution [30], where ψ is its conditional wave function, and they cannot prepare a
particle with a specific position q ∈ R3 and a wave function ψ other than a Dirac delta
function (i.e., a wave function concentrated on a single point). Furthermore, they cannot
measure the position at time t without disturbing the particle: its future trajectory will
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be significantly different from what it would have been without a measurement. A
limitation to knowledge that applies to all versions of quantum mechanics is that wave
functions cannot be measured (e.g., [20]); i.e., if Alice prepares a particle with a wave
function ψ of her choice then Bob cannot find out, from experiments on the particle,
what ψ is. He could determine ψ, however, if Alice prepared many particles, each with
the same wave function ψ. Further such limitations are described in Sections 6 and
7 below. Some researchers feel that theories that entail limitations to knowledge are
bad; since, as just pointed out, every version of quantum mechanics must admit such
limitations, such a sentiment seems inadequate.
Variables besides the wave function, such as the position variables Qk(t) in Bohmian
mechanics, are traditionally called “hidden variables.” This terminology has stuck but
one should be aware that it is rather misleading: Qk(t) can in principle be measured
at any time t to any desired accuracy (so it is hardly “hidden”), whereas ψt cannot—so
it is really the wave function, which Bohmian mechanics has in common with OQM,
which is a “hidden variable” [11].
5 Differences to Orthodox Quantum Mechanics
Orthodox quantum mechanics (OQM) is the traditional understanding of quantum me-
chanics which goes back to the “Copenhagen interpretation” of Niels Bohr. It insists
that quantum particles do not have trajectories, and more generally that there are no
further variables besides ψ (for microscopic systems), so that ψ is the complete de-
scription of the state (e.g., [16], [67, Chap. III.2], [46, p. 5–6]), whereas in Bohmian
mechanics the state (i.e., the real factual situation) is represented by the pair (Q,ψ).
On the other hand, it is assumed in OQM that macroscopic (“classical”) quantities do
always have sharp values and cannot be in a superposition, so there are also some kind
of “hidden variables” in OQM, except that it remains vague which quantities exactly
are supposed to be “classical,” and which equations govern them. In Bohmian mechan-
ics, a categorization of systems as “classical” and “quantum” may be convenient but is
fundamentally unnecessary, as the entire universe is governed by the laws (1), (3), (5),
so there is no problem about regarding the entire universe as quantum.
A deeper difference between OQM and Bohmian mechanics concerns a philosophical
attitude that can be called “positivism” and whose central idea is that a statement is
unscientific or even meaningless if it cannot be tested experimentally, that an object is
not real if it cannot be observed, and that a variable is not well-defined if it cannot be
measured. Positivism suggests that science should limit itself to operational statements
such as “if one performs experiment X then one obtains outcome Y with probability
Z.” That is why the usual axioms of quantum mechanics are about what observers
will see. I regard this form of positivism as exaggerated and implausible: for example,
events behind the horizon of a black hole may be unobservable to all outside observers
but would very much seem to be as real as outside events. In fact, I regard positivism
as refuted by the limitations to knowledge such as the impossibility of measuring wave
functions. Nevertheless, in the physics literature one often reads arguments with a posi-
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tivistic flavor, and OQM is particularly positivistically influenced. In contrast, Bohmian
mechanics takes a “realist” attitude, according to which we should make the best hy-
pothesis we can about what actually happens in reality. The reason we make these
hypotheses is that we would like to find out how the world works [52].
A related philosophical difference between OQM and Bohmian mechanics is that
OQM finds it acceptable to say contradictory things about what happens in reality
as long as all operational predictions remain unaffected by the contradictions. This
attitude, which makes OQM incoherent from a realist perspective, is often regarded by
advocates of OQM as an aspect of complementarity; it is often accompanied by the
attitude that everything we say about what happens in reality is anyway only metaphor
and should not be taken seriously. In contrast, in Bohmian mechanics there are no
contradictions and there is no need for metaphors, as we can easily and clearly say what
actually happens in a Bohmian universe. That is because Bohmian mechanics provides
a single coherent picture of reality.
A further difference concerns the status of observables. In OQM it is common to
talk about observables as if they were quantities, as if they had values. It should not
be surprising that paradoxes arise from such loose talk. In Bohmian mechanics, also
this problem is absent as we are dealing with variables that actually have values; more
about this in Section 7 below.
6 Non-Locality
We now turn to Bell’s theorem [6, 40, 12, 50]. It is sometimes claimed (e.g., [71, p. 53],
[43]) that Bell’s theorem excludes hidden-variable theories (such as Bohmian mechanics)
because it implies that any hidden-variable theory has to be non-local (i.e., involve
faster-than-light influences), and that would be in conflict with relativity. This picture
is not quite right. Bell’s theorem actually shows that the observed probabilities in
certain experiments (Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bell experiments) are incompatible with
locality, so our world must be non-local, and every theory in agreement with experiment
must be non-local. Since these observed probabilities are predicted by the predictive
rules of quantum theory, one can also conclude that every theory in agreement with
these rules must be non-local. Bohmian mechanics agrees with these rules, and it is
non-local. Thus, Bell’s theorem does not at all exclude Bohmian mechanics but, on the
contrary, proves its non-local character inevitable. And non-locality need not conflict
with relativity, as illustrated particularly by the relativistic Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber
(GRW) theory [63, 50].
The widespread misperception that Bell’s theorem concern only hidden-variable the-
ories and have nothing to say about other approaches presumably originates from the
fact that John Bell’s original 1964 paper [6] cited the famous 1935 paper of Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen (EPR, [35]) for showing (as it did) that locality implies the exis-
tence of hidden variables, so that Bell focused on excluding the remaining possibility
of local hidden-variable theories in order to exclude all local theories. EPR’s argument
was and is often not sufficiently appreciated, and its relevance to Bell’s argument often
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missed (see [40, 51] for elaboration).
The non-locality shows up in Bohmian mechanics in the dependence of the velocity of
particle 1 on the position of particle 2 according to (1); since this dependence is instanta-
neous, no matter how big the distance between the two particles, it is a faster-than-light
influence. As a consequence, for devising a version of Bohmian mechanics in a relativis-
tic space-time [25], we need a temporal order between spacelike-separated space-time
points, or a notion of simultaneity-at-a-distance. Such a notion can be mathematically
expressed by a foliation (slicing) F of space-time into disjoint spacelike hypersurfaces
(sometimes called “the time foliation”). In such versions of Bohmian mechanics that
have been studied, it turns out that the probabilities of experimental outcomes do not
depend on F , so that inhabitants of such a universe cannot find out empirically which
foliation F is. So in this theory, there is another limitation to knowledge: F cannot be
determined experimentally. While positivistically inclined researchers find this objec-
tionable, I find positivism objectionable. In contrast to the ether, which could simply
be eliminated from classical electrodynamics, F cannot be eliminated from Bohmian
mechanics without a breakdown of the equations. This situation suggests that F plays
a legitimate role in the theory. The theory could still be regarded as relativistic if F is
determined by a covariant law; proposals of such laws are outlined in [64, 26].
7 Observables
An analysis of the fundamental laws of Bohmian mechanics shows that there is no
apparatus with which the inhabitants could measure the velocity of a particle without
any prior knowledge of its wave function [31]; this is another limitation to knowledge.
In contrast, if the wave function is known, or is known to belong to a suitable class of
wave functions (e.g., to be in the classical regime), then the velocity can be measured;
in particular, there is no obstacle to measuring the velocity of a macroscopic object in
the classical regime. Likewise, if many particles are given, and we know that each one
has the same wave function, then the velocity of (almost) each one can be measured (as
we then can determine the wave function). A specific procedure [72, 32] of this kind,
so-called weak measurements of the velocities, has been carried out experimentally [45],
resulting in a picture similar to Figure 1.
Furthermore, if we ask about the asymptotic velocity u as t→∞ (that the particle
will ultimately have if from now on no external forces act on it) instead of the instan-
taneous velocity v at time t, then the situation is different: u, which is determined by
Q and ψ, can be measured without knowledge of ψ, and the product mu (mass times
asymptotic velocity) has the distribution known in standard quantum mechanics as the
momentum distribution, i.e., (leaving out factors of ~) |ψˆ(k)|2 with ψˆ(k) the Fourier
transform of ψ(q). The Heisenberg uncertainty relation then means the following in
Bohmian mechanics: While position and momentum (understood as mu) of a particle
do have actual values, inhabitants cannot know both values with inaccuracies whose
product is smaller than ~/2, even if they know the particle’s wave function. (This is
another limitation to knowledge.)
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In contrast to position and momentum (mu), energy, angular momentum, and spin
do not even have actual values (except for special wave functions, viz., eigenfunctions
of energy or angular momentum or spin). Rather, the experiments that are commonly
called “quantum measurements” of energy etc., create random1 outcomes instead of
revealing pre-existing quantities (as in the ordinary meaning of “measuring”). Thus,
ironically, Bohmian mechanics is a “no hidden variables” theory for most observables.
For example, a Stern–Gerlach experiment, the usual experiment for a quantum mea-
surement of a component of spin, say σz, uses a magnetic field to direct the up-component
of ψ into a different spatial region than the down-component, and then uses a detector
to find out in which region the particle is. When the particle is found in the region con-
taining the up-component, one says that the outcome is “spin up.” This example shows
several things: First, that there is no need to introduce an actual value for spin compo-
nents, as the Stern–Gerlach experiment is explained with positions and wave functions
alone. Second, that z-spin then is not a well-defined quantity in Bohmian mechanics,
except when the wave function is an eigenstate of the Pauli matrix σz; the value of
z-spin is only created during the experiment. Third, that there can be different experi-
ments, all of which are “quantum measurements” of the same observable σz, but which
lead to different outcomes when applied to particles in the same Bohmian initial state
(Q,ψ): indeed, inverting the field and interchanging the regions for “up” and “down”
would still lead to the same statistics of “up” and “down” for a given ψ but not to the
same outcome2 for fixed Q and ψ. And fourth, it further follows that it is, in fact, not
possible to introduce an actual value Sz of σz such that every Stern–Gerlach experiment
that qualifies as a quantum measurement of σz yields Sz as the outcome. See [55] for
elaboration about spin in Bohmian mechanics.
There are various “no hidden variables” theorems [7, 44]. Some of them, such as
the Kochen–Specker theorem, do not apply to Bohmian mechanics because Bohmian
mechanics does not associate actual values with most quantum observables. However,
for other theorems, such as the Bell inequality theorem, this does not matter much
because we may choose a specific experiment (including, if necessary, the wave function
and configuration of the apparatus) for each of the relevant observables, and Bohmian
mechanics then does determine the outcome as a function of the particle’s Q and ψ.
Specifically, the Bell inequality theorem then shows that for an EPR pair (Q = (Qa,Qb),
ψ = 2−1/2(|↑↓〉− |↓↑〉)φa(qa)φb(qb), where the supports of φa and φb are separated) on
which Alice and Bob each carry out a Stern–Gerlach experiment about a spin component
of their choice, say Alice first and Bob later, the function that yields Bob’s outcome as
a function of Q and ψ depends also on Alice’s choice. That is, the theorem proves that
1The outcomes are, in fact, determined by the initial wave function χ(qa) of the apparatus, its
initial configuration Qa, the coupling Hamiltonian, and the object’s initial wave function ϕ(qs) and
configuration Qs together; but they are in general not functions of ϕ and Qs alone. See also [36] for a
discussion of deterministic randomness.
2Concretely, the inverted field would deflect the z-down component of ψ upwards, and in certain
simple cases with ψ = |x-up〉, the Bohmian particle would be deflected upwards whenever the initial
position is in the upper half of the packet, resulting in outcome “down” with the inverted field but
outcome “up” with the original field; see, e.g., [55, Sec. V] for details.
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Bohmian mechanics is non-local, which was clear already before Bell [13, p. 186].
Let us return to a fact mentioned before: Two different experiments, which have
different outcomes when acting on the same Bohmian state (Q,ψ), may still have the
same statistics of outcomes when fed with a random Q that is |ψ|2 distributed. The
statistics can, in fact, be expressed in terms of operators, more precisely of a POVM
(positive-operator-valued measure) [65]; this means in our case that with every possible
outcome z of the experiment there is associated a positive self-adjoint operator F (z)
such that, when the experiment is applied to a system with wave function ψ (with
‖ψ‖ = 1), then the probability distribution of the random outcome Z is given by
Pψ(Z = z) = 〈ψ|F (z)|ψ〉 (9)
for every z [31]. That is how operators come up as “observables” in Bohmian mechanics:
They encode the probability distribution of Z as a function of ψ. The operators F (z)
have the property that they add up to the identity operator I,
∑
z F (z) = I. In the
special case that the z are real numbers and the F (z) are projections, the POVM F (·)
can equivalently be represented by the self-adjoint operator
A =
∑
z
z F (z) (10)
of which it is the spectral decomposition (i.e., the z are the eigenvalues of A, and
F (z) is the projection to the eigenspace). That is why self-adjoint operators represent
observables in many relevant cases.
So two different experiments can have equal statistics for every ψ, and this happens
when they have the same POVM F (·). Since in orthodox terminology one says in
this case that the two experiments “measure the same quantum observable,” it can be
difficult to appreciate that they can have different outcomes (in particular because in
OQM one cannot ask the question whether they have different outcomes). For example,
opponents of Bohmian mechanics have described an experiment whose POVM is the
usual position observable but whose outcome is not the position of the particle, have
claimed that position measurements disagree with the Bohmian position, and have called
the Bohmian trajectories “surrealistic” [37, 24]. In fact, this example only illustrates how
misleading talk about “measurements” of “observables” can be: while ordinary particle
detectors do find the particles at their Bohmian positions, this particular experiment
does not measure position although it is a “quantum measurement” of the “position
observable,”3 meaning merely that the distribution of its outcomes agrees with |ψ(q)|2.
3Here is another, simpler exampe of an experiment with this property. Consider two normalized
1-dimensional wave packets ψ1, ψ2 centered around the locations x1, x2 respectively, with x1 < x2 and
ψ1 moving to the right and ψ2 to the left, such that they exchange places in one time unit. On the
2-dimensional subspace S of the superpositions ψ = c1ψ1 + c2ψ2 consider, as the analog of the position
observable, the operator A = x1|ψ1〉〈ψ1| + x2|ψ2〉〈ψ2|, which is a coarse-grained position observable.
Consider two experiments on a system with normalized initial wave function ψ ∈ S: (i) measure the
(coarse-grained) position at time 0; (ii) let the system evolve to time 1, then measure the (coarse-
grained) position and exchange x1 ↔ x2 in the result. Both experiments yield x1 with probability |c1|2
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8 History
That quantum particles may have trajectories “guided” by a wave was proposed as early
as 1923 by Albert Einstein [70, p. 463] and John Slater [60, p. 9], [53, p. 544] but not
published. The equation of motion (1) was considered, without spin, by Louis de Broglie
in 1926 [22] but later abandoned because he incorrectly believed that the theory made
empirically wrong predictions. It was rediscovered independently by Nathan Rosen in
1945 [58] and David Bohm in 1952 [13]. Bohm was the first to realize that the theory
actually makes empirically correct predictions. The correct extension to particles with
spin was given by John Bell in 1966 [7]; Bell also contributed to the exploration and
clarification of the theory [12].
Bohm [13] formulated the theory in an awkward way by introducing a second-order
equation (the one obtained from (1) by taking a time derivative on both sides and ex-
pressing ∂ψ/∂t via the Schro¨dinger equation) as the equation of motion and demanding
that the initial positions Qj(0) and the initial velocities V j(0) = dQj/dt be related ac-
cording to a “constraint condition” identical to (1). Since it then follows mathematically
that (1) is satisfied at all times, Bohm’s prescription is actually equivalent to saying that
Q(t) is a solution of (1) at all times. Bohm also suggested introducing additional hidden
variables for spin [15], an unnecessary move, as discussed above.
9 Typicality and the Origin of Randomness
Bohm realized, by means analogous to the considerations in Section 3 above, that inhab-
itants of a universe governed by Bohmian mechanics will observe statistics of outcomes
of experiments in agreement with the predictive rules of standard quantum mechanics
(for short, “the quantum statistics”), including the joint distribution of several exper-
iments. A deeper analysis was provided by Detlef Du¨rr, Sheldon Goldstein, and Nino
Zangh`ı [30] with a result that parallels the law of large numbers in probability theory as
follows. Recall that the outcomes of all experiments are determined by the initial wave
function Ψ = Ψ(0) and the initial configuration Q = Q(0) of the universe (even if the
necessary calculation cannot be carried out in practice). The result of Du¨rr et al. shows
that, for given Ψ, most Q are such that inhabitants throughout the world history will
observe the quantum statistics. Here, “most” means the following: we say that “most
Q have property X” if ∫
S
dq |Ψ(q)|2 is close to 1 (11)
with S the set of all Q with property X. That is why it suffices, as a fundamental
law of Bohmian mechanics, to demand that Q be typical with respect to |Ψ|2. This is
and x2 with probability |c2|2, so they are quantum measurements of the same observable (A at time
0). However, since Bohmian trajectories cannot cross, some of them start at time 0 near x1 and end
up at time 1 near x1, and in that case the result of experiment (ii) does not agree with the position
of the Bohmian particle at time 0. Note that there is nothing mysterious about the fact that the two
experiments have the same distribution although they produce different outcomes.
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close to saying that Q was chosen randomly with distribution |Ψ|2 but a little different.
For example, the sequence of digits of pi (314159265. . . ) “looks random” in the long run
although it cannot be said to be random. Put differently, for the purpose of the statistical
looks of the sequence, pi is a typical number in the interval [0, 4]. Likewise, for Q it is only
relevant that it “looks as if chosen randomly with |Ψ|2 distribution” and not whether it
is random in a fundamental sense; and the “looks” refers to the macroscopic history of
Q(t). Thus, from the perspective of the inhabitants it is indistinguishable from being
random, so the typicality of Q is the origin of randomness in a Bohmian universe.
It has been pointed out [66] that the motion of the Bohmian configuration is often
chaotic (even mixing, to be precise), with the consequence that any initial distribution
ρ 6= |ψ|2 on configuration space tends to come closer and closer to |ψt|2 over time. It has
further been suggested [13, 66] that this phenomenon may explain the |ψ|2 distribution.
However, the real question concerns not so much the configuration space of a system
as that of the universe; and there it does not seem as if a deeper insight were gained if
somebody could show (which has not been shown) that also (say) a |Ψ|4-typical or a |Ψ|0-
typical Q(0) would lead to |ψ|2-statistics for the outcomes of most experiments. While
the |Ψ|2 distribution is special since it is equivariant, the |Ψ|4 and |Ψ|0 distribution are
just some among many conceivable distributions; in fact, if we found empirically (which
we have not) that it was necessary to assume that Q(0) was |Ψ|4-distributed, then it
would be a big puzzle needing explanation why it was |Ψ|4 of all distributions instead
of the natural, equivariant |Ψ|2.
10 Identical Particles
The symmetrization postulate of quantum mechanics applies equally in Bohmian me-
chanics. It asserts that when particle i and particle j belong to the same particle species,
then the wave function is either symmetric or anti-symmetric against the permutation
of their coordinates and spin indices,
ψ...si...sj ...(...qi...qj...) = γ ψ...sj ...si...(...qj...qi...) (12)
with γ = −1 if the species is fermionic and γ = +1 if bosonic. It has been suggested in
the literature (e.g., [46, p. 227]) that the reason behind the symmetrization postulate is
that there are no trajectories in quantum mechanics and therefore no fact about which
particle at time t1 is which particle at time t2; however, Bohmian mechanics shows that
the symmetrization postulate is compatible with the existence of trajectories.
On the other hand, if we take the particles seriously, as we do in Bohmian mechan-
ics, then, for a system of N identical particles, the particles should not be numbered,
as there is no fact in the physical world about which particle is particle number 1.
Therefore, two configurations that differ only by a permutation, such as (q3, q1, q2)
and (q1, q2, q3), should be regarded as two mathematical representations of the same
physical configuration. Thus, the space of physical configurations is the space “NR3”
of unordered configurations [47], i.e., of permutation classes of N -tuples (leaving out
for simplicity the N -tuples containing repetitions such as q1 = q2) or of N -element
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subsets of physical 3-space, as opposed to the space R3N of ordered configurations. Now
Bohm’s law of motion (1) is such that for a wave function that is either symmetric or
anti-symmetric, two initial configurations that differ only by a permutation evolve to
later configurations at any time t that differ only by a permutation (in fact, the same
permutation). Therefore, it defines a curve in NR3, as it should. This would not be
so for general wave functions (neither bosonic nor fermionic), and this situation can be
regarded as a reason behind the symmetrization postulate [4, 27]. Since NR3 is a topo-
logically non-trivial space, this approach to explaining the symmetrization postulate,
which goes back to Jon M. Leinaas and Jan Myrheim [47], is known as the “topological”
approach.
11 The Classical Limit
In OQM, some systems have to be “classical” in order to even make sense of the theory.
In Bohmian mechanics, in contrast, no problem would arise even if no system were in a
classical regime. Nevertheless, such a regime actually governs many systems, particularly
macroscopic ones. In OQM the classical limit is problematical because of the unsolved
problem of how definite properties (e.g., definite positions) of macroscopic objects arise,
given that these objects consist of quantum particles (electrons and quarks) that can
be in arbitrary superpositions. No such problem affects Bohmian mechanics: There,
particles have trajectories, and the study of the classical limit concerns merely the clear
mathematical question under which conditions these trajectories (or the center-of-mass
trajectories of macroscopic bodies) will obey Newton’s equation of motion
mk
d2Qk(t)
dt2
= −∇kV (Q(t)) . (13)
See [1] for an overview of results about this question. In brief, (13) tends to hold when
two mechanisms prevail: decoherence [21] and the tendency of wave functions to become
locally plane waves.
12 Quantum Field Theory
Leaving aside the circumstance that in most quantum field theories the Hamiltonians
are mathematically ill defined (and that it is unknown how to define them rigorously
[68]), Bohmian mechanics can be extended to quantum field theory in several ways. It
has not been settled which Bohm-type model is the most convincing one. The proposed
extensions differ in whether they use a field ontology or a particle ontology. For a field
ontology (see [61] for an overview), one assumes that instead of a particle configura-
tion, the variable besides ψ is a field configuration (a function on 3-space). A particle
ontology, in contrast, means to stick with a particle configuration. Also combinations
are conceivable: Bohm [13] proposed to use a particle ontology for fermions and a field
ontology for the bosonic degrees of freedom. It seems not possible to set up a field
ontology for fermions.
13
With a particle ontology, it seems natural to introduce the possibility of creation and
annihilation of particles. Such models have been set up [9, 28]: for a given Hamiltonian
H and configuration operators (a projection-valued measure P (·) on configuration space
generalizing the position operators), the model is not unique, but uniquely selected by
considerations of naturalness and simplicity. These models are no longer determinis-
tic but instead stochastic, as the creation and annihilation events correspond to jump
between sectors of configuration space corresponding to different particle numbers, and
every jump towards a higher particle number has to be stochastic, or else Q(t) could not
be continuously distributed in the higher sector, so that |ψ|2 could not be equivariant.
Such considerations lead to a particular rate (probability per time) for the jump from
q′ to anywhere in the volume element dq, given by [28]
σψ(q′ → dq) = 2
~
Im+〈ψ|P (dq)HP (dq′)|ψ〉
〈ψ|P (dq′)|ψ〉 (14)
with x+ = max{x, 0}.
It may be noteworthy that although Bohmian mechanics is deterministic, neither
Bohm nor Bell nor the authors of [28] found or find stochastic theories unacceptable.
Rather, the simplest and most convincing theory of non-relativistic quantum mechan-
ics (i.e., Bohmian mechanics) happens to be deterministic, and the simplest and most
convincing theory of particle creation happens to be stochastic. Speaking of stochas-
tic theories, I note that a variant of Bohmian mechanics for non-relativistic quantum
mechanics with stochastic trajectories (a diffusion process) was proposed by Edward
Nelson under the name “stochastic mechanics” [54, 38]. While Nelson’s initial hopes
that this theory might somehow get rid of the wave function, and that it might provide
a superior explanation of randomness, have not materialized, it does provide a coherent
and working theory when understood in the same way as Bohmian mechanics. It has
received less attention because it is more complicated than Bohmian mechanics (as it
involves stochastic processes) while not being more convincing.
Another open question that comes up when setting up Bohmian versions of quantum
field theories is whether the Dirac sea4 should be taken literally. Some authors [19, 23]
have proposed that electrons are real whereas positrons are literally just empty spots
in a sea of electrons of negative energy. Others [28] have suggested that the situation
is fundamentally symmetric between electrons and positrons, so that positrons are real
particles in their own right, and that we are not surrounded by a sea of electrons that
we usually do not notice; in such models, the Dirac sea has the status of a metaphor or
mathematical analogy, but not of a reality.
4The Dirac sea is, roughly speaking, the picture that electrons cannot occur in a state of negative
energy because all negative energy states are occupied in the wave function of the universe and, since
electrons are fermions, a state cannot be occupied twice. Any unoccupied state of negative energy then
appears like a positron of positive energy.
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13 Philosophical Questions
Bohmian mechanics is the subject of ongoing philosophical debate. One question con-
cerns the ontological status of the wave function in Bohmian mechanics: Can a function
on configuration space be physically real? Or is the wave function to be regarded as
nomological, i.e., as something like a law (roughly analogous to the Hamiltonian func-
tion in classical mechanics), instead of as a thing [42]? Another question concerns the
possible choices in quantum field theory, such as field ontology versus particle ontology:
Which variant of the theory is the most convincing one? In some examples, different
variants of Bohmian mechanics are empirically equivalent, so that no experiment can
decide between them; it may nevertheless be possible, even natural, to prefer one over
the other on theoretical or philosophical grounds (see [41] for examples).
Another circle of philosophical questions concerns the following. Bohmian mechan-
ics contains certain elements in its ontology, the particles with positions Qk(t), that
immediately represent the distribution of matter in space. Such variables, and such
elements of the ontology, are often called the primitive ontology [30, 3, 52]. I feel that
for a fundamental physical theory to be acceptable, it must have a primitive ontology.
This leads to questions such as: What exactly is required of a theory’s ontology to make
it acceptable as a fundamental physical theory? What kinds of things can constitute
a primitive ontology? For example, Everett’s many-worlds interpretation proposes that
there is only wave function in the world; this does not seem to me to make enough sense
as a fundamental physical theory (see also [49]), but this problem can be taken care of
by introducing a suitable primitive ontology [2], which leads to a modified theory with
many-worlds character that makes clear sense.
14 Further Reading
A classic article is Bell’s [10] overview of different interpretations of quantum mechanics.
An introductory article about Bohmian mechanics, particularly for philosophers, can
be found in [39]. Book-length introductions are provided in [34, 17]. Physical and
mathematical applications of Bohmian mechanics are discussed in the collections [18, 56].
Acknowledgment. I thank Travis Norsen and the editors for comments on a draft of this
article.
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